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# **National Intelligence Bulletin**

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### PORTUGAL

Prime Minister - designate Azevedo, after consultation with the political parties, has announced that a new government will be named in two or three days. The anti-Communist faction of Major Melo Antunes, meanwhile, has taken steps to consolidate its position within Portugal's ruling military councils.

The Antunes group, excluded from recent meetings of the Revolutionary Council, quickly made its presence felt when a revamped council met for the first time yesterday. The council decided:

- To appoint Antunes supporter Vasco Lourenco head of a committee to restructure both the Revolutionary Council and the Communist-dominated Armed Forces General Assembly.
- To reinstate anti-Communist former council members Melo Antunes and Vitor Alves.
- To prevent unauthorized announcements about military units and their political views.
- To proscribe interviews by military figures other than members of the council, in an apparent attempt to prevent public statements by former prime minister Goncalves and other pro-Communist officers.

With the announced restructuring of the assembly, the council, which since July has been relegated to a purely advisory role, appeared to be reasserting itself as the supreme authority in the country. As evidence of its new authority, the council decreed that disciplinary measures would be taken against a military police regiment that has refused to go to Angola.

The council also confirmed the military's intention to play a dominant political role when it launched an investigation into statements made by a local leader of the center-left Popular Democratic Party. The party official had urged that the Armed Forces Movement be dissolved, that the Revolutionary Council be scrapped, and that the military return to its barracks and leave the running of the country to civilian politicians.

It is not yet clear what effect, if any, the Antunes group's new assertiveness will have on the formation of the new government. During the struggle to remove Goncalves, the Antunes faction reportedly pursued a joint strategy with the

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Socialists and Popular Democrats. The goodwill established during that period could easily break down, however, if the political parties' excessive demands for power frustrate the military in its desire to form a government and get the country moving again.

US embassy sources reported yesterday that both the democratic parties and the Communists could cause trouble in the selection of a government, but last evening Azevedo was confident that he could present a cabinet soon. His confidence seemed to be borne out by the Goncalves cabinet's announcement that it will remain in office until the new government is sworn in.

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### USSR-US

Two prominent members of Moscow's Institute of the USA and Canada have in recent articles defended Soviet detente policy against Western critics, and perhaps against domestic skeptics as well.

The articles seem to be fresh evidence of Moscow's concern over what it regards as renewed anti-Soviet sentiment in the West, particularly in the US. Both articles betray a certain defensiveness about the future of detente—in one case by a blustery tone, in the other by an apparently forced effort to reassure that all will be well in relations between the US and the USSR.

*Izvestia* on September 4 published a lengthy article by Georgy Arbatov, director of the institute and Moscow's leading academic authority on the US. Evidently responding to Western denigration of the European security agreement, Arbatov defends the USSR against charges of noncompliance, especially with the human contacts provisions of "Basket Three," by launching a sharp counterattack aimed at discrediting the West's right to pass judgment on the Soviet Union. Arbatov's tough line may be intended to set the stage for future rebuffs of Western efforts to "interfere" in Soviet internal affairs. He may also want to assure his internal audience that Moscow's interest in promoting detente will not lead to an easing of its tight control over domestic affairs.

In a clear message to the West, Arbatov denies that the Soviets are seeking to use detente to "nudge forward" class and national liberation struggles. He denies that the difficulties facing the US in Greece, Turkey, and Portugal are a consequence of Soviet actions. At the same time, he expressly rejects any interpretation of detente as entailing a Soviet obligation to preserve the "social status quo." In essence, Arbatov argues that the USSR has every right under detente to support its friends.

Arbatov also seems to be reassuring his domestic readers that support for detente remains strong in the US. He implicitly cautions his Soviet readers not to overestimate the strength of detente's opponents and not to turn away from a policy that has brought the USSR "striking" achievements.

The message that US-Soviet relations are still generally headed in the right direction is also conveyed in an article appearing in the September issue of the Soviet journal *International Affairs*. Written by Genrikh Trofimenko, a senior staff member of Arbatov's institute, the article contends that bilateral relations have attained a "certain stability" that can sustain tension-producing shocks. He cites the 1973 Middle East crisis and 1974 US trade legislation as sources of tension whose effects have been fully overcome.

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Trofimenko argues that the complex of bilateral agreements since 1972 has created a stabilizing basis for relations which, if not unshakable, has at least permitted the two sides to weather subsequent problems without a damaging "ripple" effect.

Trofimenko adds to this rosy assessment the view that enemies of detente in the US will be overcome. In support of this assertion he claims that even the US "establishment" now supports detente with the USSR. He professes confidence that economic relations will be normalized and that further progress will be made on limiting strategic weapons.





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**USSR**

The Soviet regime has reversed itself and is granting permission for Moscow's unconventional artists to hold a ten-day indoor exhibit of their works starting September 20.

According to the US embassy, both the original decision in late August to ban the exhibit and the reversal a week later were made at the Central Committee level. A similar but smaller scale show of unorthodox art is reportedly scheduled to open in Leningrad tomorrow.

The regime may have acted to avoid unfavorable Western publicity on the first anniversary—September 15—of the "art massacre" in Moscow. Plans were already afoot among the unconventional artists to mark the anniversary of the regime's use of bulldozers and water cannon to disrupt an open-air art show. The artists' determination to act regardless of the consequences may have convinced the authorities that a compromise this year is the best way to minimize publicity.

The artists say they are very satisfied with the current arrangements, which provide for showing some 1,000 paintings by almost 200 exhibitors in a large, two-story hall. No prior censorship of the works has been imposed, save for a ban on "anti-Soviet" and "pornographic" art.

The regime, however, did score points in scheduling the exhibit to open after the September 15 anniversary and in limiting exhibitors to those legally resident in Moscow. Similarly, the Leningrad show is limited to artists resident in that city. There are press reports that a splinter group of artists in Moscow is unhappy with these stipulations and that some of them are planning an unauthorized "gesture" in the capital either on September 15 or during the later exhibit.

By limiting the shows in Moscow and Leningrad to local artists, the regime avoids direct involvement by the Ministry of Culture. Local cultural affairs come under the jurisdiction of municipal authorities. Minister of Culture and candidate Politburo member Petr Demichev can thus disclaim responsibility for the shows' success or failure.

The situation faced by the artists mirrors in many ways that of the dissidents, Jews, and others regarded by the regime as being on the dangerous fringe of Soviet society. Many of them initially had hoped the European Security Conference would result in an easing of domestic conditions even while Soviet propaganda was doing its utmost to disabuse them of their hopes.

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The regime's see-saw attitude toward the artists illustrates the continuing inertia in Soviet cultural policy and the resulting disarray at the local level. On a wider scale, this attitude has produced a pattern of reluctant concessions to those few able to enlist Western publicity, while the many without a voice must endure a continuing campaign against unorthodoxy.

It is possible that the coming months may witness some upsurge in dissident activities. Such activity could spark conflict as dissidents seek new ways to turn the spotlight of both Western publicity and official pressure onto the Soviet domestic scene.

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### CHINA-VIETNAM

Peking's treatment of Hanoi's National Day last week points up continuing frictions between the two countries, as well as China's concern that Hanoi is falling under Moscow's domination.

The celebrations in Hanoi, marking the 30th anniversary of the communist government's founding, called for high-level Chinese attention, but Peking appears to have played down the importance of the event as well as the current status of China's relations with North Vietnam.

Neither the message from Chinese leaders, including Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, nor the *People's Daily* editorial marking the occasion included the enthusiastic expressions of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity that were features of Chinese statements in the past.

Although China sent a fairly high-level delegation to Hanoi led by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, Peking displayed a clear lack of enthusiasm for the anniversary. In a speech delivered at a Vietnamese iron and steel complex, Chen did refer to China's "internationalist obligation" to support the Vietnamese, whom he referred to as "close comrades in arms and brothers," but he also took the opportunity to lecture the Vietnamese on the dangers of Soviet machinations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

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[REDACTED] To their own people, the Chinese have portrayed their problems with the Vietnamese as resulting from Soviet "meddling," probably to disguise the seriousness of Peking's difficulties with Hanoi and to prevent relations from getting any worse. Over the long run, however, the Chinese view of Hanoi as a Soviet-backed challenger to Peking's own influence in Southeast Asia could mean that relations between the two countries will deteriorate even further.

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

### USSR - NORTH YEMEN

Sana's military relations with Moscow are continuing to deteriorate. North Yemen's minister of state said last week that while a decision had been made in principle to ask the 114-man Soviet military advisory mission to leave the country, the Yemeni leadership has not decided on the timing of this action.

Announcement of the Soviet expulsion was expected to be made during National Day ceremonies on September 26. North Yemen, however, has postponed for at least a month the protocol visit of Chief of Staff Al-Ghashmi to Saudi Arabia, during which final arrangements for military assistance to replace Moscow's aid reportedly will be completed. While the Saudis have not demanded the Soviet mission's expulsion as a condition for their aid, the minister of state said that the need for the Soviets' departure was "understood."

Sana is unlikely to press for the recall of the Soviets until a Saudi-financed \$200-million arms deal with the US is concluded. Two years have passed since the Saudis first promised financial assistance, and it may still be some time before the money is forthcoming.


Meanwhile, morale among the Soviet advisers is said to be low, and their overbearing attitude and behavior have further irritated Yemeni officials.



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
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
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AUSTRALIA: This year's proposed defense budget reflects an effort to forestall further erosion of the country's defense capabilities. The \$2.3 billion allocated to the Department of Defense, including a \$220-million increase in funds, is 8 percent of the total budget, compared with about 9 for last year. This is an indication that the armed forces are somewhat less affected by the overall policy of restraint in government spending. There has, however, been a major reallocation of defense funds, the most dramatic being a cutback in foreign military assistance, which has been more than halved. Major expenditures will be for defense equipment. In a press conference on September 3, Defense Minister Morrison announced a \$369.9-million hardware acquisition program, evidently to be spread over the next five years. The bulk of this expenditure will be for replacements for obsolescent equipment, mainly transport aircraft, tanks, and light trucks. Morrison stated recently that it will take two and a half years before the forces' capabilities have reached a satisfactory level.



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CAMBODIA: Prince Norodom Sihanouk left Peking today by plane for Phnom Penh. He was accompanied by his wife, two sons, Prime Minister Penn Nouth, and a small number of aides. Sihanouk and his party were given an elaborate public sendoff, including a departure ceremony at the airport attended by senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. Sihanouk's departure marks the end of his more than five years in China.



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